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A modern trend exists in the law toward universal
electronic service.' Indeed, federal courts have recently
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1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "service" as the
"formal delivery of a writ, summons, or other legal process" and defining
"service of process" as the "formal delivery of some other legal notice, such as a
pleading"). Electronic service refers to service made by e-mail, facsimile or other
electronic means. "E-mail" is shorthand for "electronic mail," which the New
York State Court of Appeals has described as an:
Evolutionary hybrid of traditional telephone line communications and
regular postal service mail .... [T]o transmit a message, one must
have access to an on-line service's e-mail system and must know the
recipient's personal e-mail address. Once this is accomplished, a person
may communicate by composing a message in the e-mail computer
system and dispatching it telephonically (or through some other
dedicated electronic line) to one or more recipients' electronic
mailboxes.
Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 541 (N.Y. 1999) (citation and
footnote omitted). See also Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851
(1997) ("E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic message-generally
akin to a note or letter-to another individual or to a group of addressees. The
message is generally stored electronically, sometimes waiting for the recipient
to check her 'mailbox' and sometimes making its receipt known through some
type of prompt."); .Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?:
Monitoring and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 429, 471-72
(1998) (noting that regular postal service mail is known colloquially as "snail
mail"). E-mail is sent over the Internet, which is "an international network of
interconnected computers ... enabl[ing] tens of millions of people to
communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information from
around the world." Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-50; see also Philip Giordano, Invoking
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issued a series of decisions allowing electronic service of
process on parties' outside the United States, particularly
where traditional methods of service prove inadequate.'
Part I of this article contains a brief overview of the
historical expansion of the territorial scope of service of
process, which has generally mirrored expanded notions of
personal jurisdiction. Part II discusses the provisions in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") authorizing
electronic service of process on parties outside the United
States under certain circumstances. Part III reviews
instances where courts have permitted such electronic
service of process. Part IV summarizes the circumstances
under which electronic service of process has been
permitted on parties outside the United States. Part V
identifies a trend in the law toward universal electronic
service. Moreover, Part V argues that this trend should be
extended by amending FRCP 4 in order to allow parties to
effect electronic service of process inside the United States
in the same manner that courts allow electronic service of
process outside the United States. Part V further contends
that existing portions of the FRCP should be interpreted to
permit electronic service of subpoenas and other papers.
Finally, Part VI concludes that the trend towards electronic
service will eventually become the rule rather than the
exception in light of increasing globalization and
technological advancements that will improve the certainty
and reliability of electronic service.
I. SERVICE OF PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION: A
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
When examining the bounds of permissible service of
process, it is necessary to discuss the distinct but related
concept of personal jurisdiction.4 Personal jurisdiction is not
Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2
(defining the Internet as "a vast inter-connection of computer networks that
communicate according to the same rules and now span the globe").
2. This article uses "parties" as a general description of all persons and
entities; it is not necessarily used to refer to litigants or named parties to a suit.
3. This trend has influenced New York law, which has recently been
interpreted to permit electronic service of process on a party located outside the
United States. See infra Part III.
4. These concepts are sometimes confused for one another. According to
Professor James Moore:
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the focus of this article and it is discussed at length by
scores of commentators.5 Nonetheless, a brief discussion of
the development of personal jurisdiction in Americanjurisprudence is essential to a proper understanding of the
rules governing service of process'-which is designed to
notify interested parties of pending proceedings. Both
[Slervice of process is distinct from the requirement of a jurisdictional
basis. Consequently, even if a proper jurisdictional basis exists, service
of process that does not meet due process and statutory requirements
will vitiate jurisdiction .... Similarly, the fact that proper service was
made does not mean that the court may exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant.
See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 108.01(2)(c) (3d
ed. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Professor Moore further suggests that the
"traditional territorial power theory is likely responsible for any confusion
between the basis and process requirements for jurisdiction, because, according
to early theory, personal service of process within the forum state was the only
adequate basis for personal jurisdiction over a non-consenting nonresident
defendant." Id.
5. See generally In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 577-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(discussing the evolution of the law of personal jurisdiction); Sarah R. Cebik, "A
Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma": General Personal Jurisdiction
and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 1 (same); William M.
Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 599 (1993)
(same). Moreover, "[als the Internet has experienced nearly exponential growth
over the past few years, its impact on conventional notions of personal
jurisdiction has been hotly debated in courts throughout the country and in
countless law review articles and treatises." Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F.
Supp. 2d 104, 113 (D. Conn. 1998); see, e.g., 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1073.1 (3d ed. 2002)
(discussing the Internet's impact on personal jurisdiction); Michael A. Geist, Is
There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345 (2001) (same); Susan Nauss Exon, A New Shoe is
Needed to Walk Through Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1
(2000) (same); Joseph Schmitt & Peter Nikolai, Application of Personal
Jurisdiction Principles to Electronic Commerce: A User's Guide, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1571 (2001) (same); Note, Civil Procedure-D.C. Circuit
Rejects Sliding Scale Approach To Finding Personal Jurisdiction Based On
Internet Contacts-GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 113 HARV. L.
REV. 2128, 2133 (2000) (arguing that traditional principles of personal
jurisdiction should be applied to the Internet). Accordingly, anything more than
a brief discussion of personal jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article. A
more comprehensive discussion is found in several volumes of a leading treatise
devoted to personal jurisdiction and service of process. See generally 4-4B
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 1061 et seq. (3d eds. 2002).
6. See 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1064 (noting that FRCP 4
"cannot be understood without an appreciation of the history and current status
of the law relating to the personal jurisdiction of American courts").
7. See 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1094 (noting that "the federal
courts generally place emphasis on the principle that the purpose of service is to
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personal jurisdiction and proper service of process must
exist in order for a court to exercise its authority over a
defendant.8 As discussed below, the nineteenth century
standard for personal jurisdiction required consent,
domicile, or service of process in the forum.9 National
expansion, however, soon made this standard impractical. l
Accordingly, courts developed the modern standard to
permit the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
defendants outside the forum where such defendants
maintained minimum contacts with the forum state.1
Indeed, expanding notions of personal jurisdiction resulted
in the subsequent expansion of the territorial scope of
permissible service of process.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
personal jurisdiction generally required service of process
within the forum state 2 This territorial power theory of
jurisdiction was adopted by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer
v. Neff, which held that service of process for in personam
give the defendant notice of the institution of the proceedings"); id. § 1063
(same); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 31
(1996) ("Service of process performs two functions in Anglo-American civil
procedure: it represents assertion of judicial power of the forum state over the
person of the defendant, and it is the formal means of providing notice to the
defendant so that he or she may defend the lawsuit.").
8. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350
(1999) ("In the absence of service of process (or waiver of service by the
defendant), a court ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the
complaint names as defendant."); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (noting that both personal jurisdiction and notice must
exist for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant).
9. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1877); MOORE ET AL., supra note 4,
108.22 (discussing Pennoyer).
10. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 577-79. The In re DES Cases
Court noted that:
A legion of commentators and judges have demonstrated that the mid-
nineteenth century territorial nexus requirement needs modification
for end-of-twentieth century litigation. The growing interconnectedness
of the national economy and increased social mobility often have
rendered the requirement unworkable in its original form .... From
1877 forward, the courts were forced to expend considerable effort to
sustain Pennoyer in the face of historical developments that had
rendered its holding obsolete.
Id.; see also McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (noting that
the shift away from Pennoyer was "attributable to the fundamental
transformation of our national economy").
11. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1067 (discussing the modern
standard established by International Shoe).
12. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, 108.01(2)(c).
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actions was only effective where a defendant was personally
served within the forum state.13 Under Pennoyer "the
historical basis of in personam jurisdiction was a court's
power over the defendant's person," making presence
within the forum a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction. 14
By 1945, however, the unparalleled growth and commercial
expansion of the United States made Pennoyer's narrow
concept of personal jurisdiction impractical. 5
Pennoyer's anachronistic standard began to yield to
modern notions of personal jurisdiction developed to meet
the needs of a growing and increasingly mobile society." In
its seminal decision, International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington, the Supreme Court first employed the modern
"minimum contacts" analysis for personal jurisdiction. 7
International Shoe held that, inasmuch as:
13. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
830 n.1 (1991) (noting that Pennoyer was overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 203 (1977)); MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, 108.20 (discussing
Pennoyer's physical power theory of jurisdiction). Under Pennoyer, personal
jurisdiction also existed where a defendant: (1) consented to such; or (2) was
domiciled in the forum. Id. 108.22.
14. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203; see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) ("Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in
personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person.
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of [the] court was
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.") (citing
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791,
796 n.3 (1983) ("Traditionally, when a state court based its jurisdiction upon its
authority over the defendant's person, personal service was considered essential
for the court to bind individuals who did not submit to its jurisdiction."); In re
DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 578 (noting that the "traditional due process
concerns-whether the defendant will suffer a deprivation of liberty or property
without fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to defend-are at best only
tangentially related to [Pennoyer's] sovereignty concerns").
15. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 580 (noting that Pennoyer has
often been attacked and "[firom its inception, Pennoyer was awkward in
application"); Richman, supra note 5, at 599, 606.
16. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 577-84 (noting that International
Shoe did not completely abandon Pennoyer's sovereignty inquiry and that the
"salient feature of the history of the two independent inquiries into sovereignty
and fairness is that, when they made their formal debut together in
International Shoe, they both imported Pennoyer's territorial nexus
requirement") (emphasis in the original).
17. It is not clear that the International Shoe Court considered its
"minimum contacts" analysis to be the monumental doctrinal shift that
subsequent courts and commentators consider it to be. See, e.g., Richman, supra
note 5, at 624. Justice Black, however, may have perceived as much where he
noted that he would "decline the invitation to formulate broad rules as to the
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[Tihe capias ad respondendum1 8 has given way to personal service
of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' 9
Such minimum contacts with the forum are required in
order to make it reasonable in the context of federalism to
meaning of due process." Int'l Shoe, 326 U-.S. at 322 (Black., J., concurring).
Nonetheless, International Shoe did not completely depart from Pennoyer
inasmuch as it relied on a sovereignty analysis where it found the defendant to
be constructively present within the forum. The Court noted that "the corporate
personality is a fiction" and concluded that:
[A corporation's] presence [is] used merely to symbolize those activities
of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. ... 'Presence' in the
state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of the
corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but
also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be
sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been
given.
Id. at 316-17; see also In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 582-83 (noting that
International Shoe manifested "a genuine transformation" in adopting a
fairness analysis, but that it did not completely depart from Pennoyer where it
retained "a sovereignty inquiry"). The Court's retention of sovereignty analysis
is also evidenced in its finding that a corporation's "casual presence" such as
"single or isolated items of activities" would be insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction for suits that were "unconnected" with such activities. See Int'l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. Nonetheless, International Shoe anticipated that its
holding would be extended to individuals as well as corporations:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, or relations.
See id. at 319 (emphasis added).
18. The capias ad respondendum was an English writ directing the sheriff
to arrest a defendant, who would only be released upon the posting of a bond
sufficient to satisfy a potential judgment against him. See MOORE ET AL., supra
note 4, 108.21; see also BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 200 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
capias ad respondendum as a "writ commanding the sheriff to take the
defendant into custody to ensure that the defendant will appear in court"). This
medieval practice is the predecessor of modern day service of process. MOORE ET
AL., supra note 4, 108.21. Indeed, the most common form of service of process
upon individuals is personal service or "tagging"-a historical remnant of the
capias ad respondendum. See 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1094.
19. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted).
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require a defendant to defend a suit brought within the
forum." Thus, the Court concluded that:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise
out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to
be undue.21
Applying this standard, the International Shoe Court
found sufficient minimum contacts existed where the
defendant maintained "systematic and continuous" contacts
with the forum and where the defendant availed itself of
the benefits and privileges of doing business in the forum.2
Therefore, the Court found that personal jurisdiction
existed because it was "reasonable and just, according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice" to require the defendant to defend suit in the
forum.23
The Court also held that service of process within the
forum upon the defendant's agent, who established the
defendant's "presence" within the forum, provided sufficient
notice of the suit.24 Indeed, the Court found that "the
particular form of substituted service" is adequate where it
"gives reasonable assurance that the notice [to defendant]
will be actual."2" Notably, the Court also found that sending
defendant notice of the suit by registered mail was
20. See id. at 317.
21. Id. at 319.
22. Id. at 320.
23. Id.; see also id. at 321 (finding that inasmuch as the defendant "rendered
itself amenable to suit upon obligations arising out of the activities of its
salesmen in Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in personam
to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the privilege of employing
[defendant's] salesmen within the state"). But see id. at 324-26 (Black., J.,
concurring) (criticizing the elastic notions of "fair play," "justice," and
"reasonableness").
24. Id. at 320; see also id. at 323 (Black., J., concurring) (noting that the
defendant cannot "claim that notice by registered mail and by personal service
on its sales solicitors in Washington did not meet the requirements of
procedural due process").
25. Id. at 320.
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"reasonably calculated to apprise [defendant] of the suit."26
Indeed, by 1945 the propriety of service by mail was well-
established.27
In sum, notions of personal jurisdiction expanded from
Pennoyer's rigid territorial approach to the more flexible
standard set forth in International Shoe,25 which represents
the predominant test for ascertaining personal
jurisdiction. 29 Likewise, as the scope of personal jurisdiction
expanded, so too did the geographic scope of service of
process. In 1950, soon after the "jurisdictional revolution"
of International Shoe,3 ° the Supreme Court established a
more flexible standard of constitutionally permissible
notice. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust & Bank Co.,"1
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
26. Id.
27. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 796 n.3 (1983)
("In Hess v. Pawloski, [274 U.S. 352 (1927),] the Court recognized for the first
time that service by registered mail, in place of personal service, may satisfy the
requirements of due process.").
28. See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 616-19 (1990)
(discussing the transition from Pennoyer to International Shoe, which
represented an "inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction");
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) ("[A] trend is clearly
discernable toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and other nonresidents . .. attributable to the fundamental
transformation of our national economy."). Nonetheless, traditional means of
service such as "tagging" a defendant within the forum remain viable. See
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610, 619 (holding that defendant was subject to service of
process while temporarily in the forum and noting that "[a]mong the most
firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is
that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically
present in the State"); N. Light Tech, Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 62-63
(1st Cir.) (holding that personal service upon defendant appearing in the forum
for the purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction is a permissible method of
effecting service and noting that "process immunity" is only applicable where
the defendant is in the forum attending to different litigation), cert. denied, 533
U.S. 911 (2001).
29. See Rex R. Perschbacher, Symposium Foreword, Fifty Years of
International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 513, 514 (1995) ("Although Shoe's minimum contacts test during the
last half-century may have dominated, and may continue to influence
profoundly, personal jurisdiction in the United States, International Shoe has
never completely fulfilled its promise to provide an adequate general theory of
state-court jurisdiction. International Shoe's approach has never fully overcome
the vagueness of the minimum-contacts general principle.").
30. See Richman, supra note 5, at 624.
31. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see generally 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
5, § 1074 (discussing Mullane).
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requires that methods of service, and hence notice to
interested parties, must be "reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." 2 Mullane held that this standard
was satisfied where a trustee notified unknown
beneficiaries by publication and known beneficiaries by
mail.33  Accordingly, Mullane established the modern
standard that courts have relied on for testing the
constitutionality of service of process when permitting
electronic service.34
Similar in effect to the technological advances that
prompted expanded notions of personal jurisdiction in the
mid-twentieth century, the rise in prevalence of the
Internet and e-mail usage during the end of the twentieth
century and start of the twenty-first century have also
resulted in increased inter-jurisdictional contacts among
and between individuals and businesses. 35 This explosion in
the popularity of e-mail has affected the law in various
32. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
33. See id. at 314-20.
34. See id. at 312-16. When ascertaining whether personal jurisdiction
exists, courts must ensure that an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with both the United States Constitution as well as the forum state's long-arm
statute. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291
(1980); see also Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305
F.3d 120, 124-28 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying bifurcated personal jurisdiction
analysis); 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1069. Long-arm statutes, which
"typically authorize the exercise of jurisdiction to the extent permitted
constitutionally under a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with
International Shoe," are beyond the scope of this article. Perritt, supra note 7,
at 15.
35. See Frank Conley, Comment, :-) Service with a Smiley: The Effect of E-
mail and Other Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 407, 407 (1997) ("One of the profound legal effects of this expanding
technology is the increased contact among people in widely scattered geographic
locations who are banking, forming contracts, transacting business through
electronic means, and otherwise carrying on traditional commercial
transactions."); see also Doe v. 2TheMart.Com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091
(W.D. Wash. 2001) ("The Internet represents a revolutionary advance in
communication technology. It has been suggested that the Internet may be the
'greatest innovation in speech since the invention of the printing press .... 'It
allows people from all over the world to exchange ideas and information freely
and in 'real-time.'") (citation omitted).
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ways,36 including through the increased use of e-mail and
other electronic means to effect service of process.3 7
Although a few commentators have addressed electronic
service of process, all such work predates recent court
decisions allowing electronic service of process.3' Therefore,
this article will discuss these developments in this evolving
area of the law.
36. See Doe, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (noting that the "rapid growth of
Internet communication and Internet commerce has raised novel and complex
legal issues and has challenged existing legal doctrine in many areas").
37. See infra Part III.
38. See generally Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?: E-mail and
(Due) Service of Process, 51 S.C. L. REV. 227, 228 (2000) (discussing the
"feasibility of electronic or e-mail service of process to give defendants notice of
legal proceedings instituted against them in United States courts"); id. at 251
("To date, however, no United States court has found that e-mail may serve as
an adequate method of delivering initial notice of litigation to an individual
defendant or business entity."); Rachel Cantor, Comment, Internet Service of
Process: A Constitutionally Adequate Alternative?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 954-
66 (1999) (contending that electronic service is permissible under Mullane but
that it is not expressly permitted under the FRCP unless permitted by state
law; n.b. that Cantor does not consider the possibility of electronic service under
FRCP 4(f)(3)); Conley, supra note 36, at 408-10, 428 (suggesting that e-mail
service of process should be adopted where it is "the only available method of
communication with a defendant"); see also Perritt, supra note 8, at 32 ("[The]
growing use of digital information technologies introduces the possibility of
electronic service of process, including telex, fax and e-mail, although these
methods of service are not yet countenanced widely. Despite the practical
feasibility and attractiveness of electronic service of process, authorization for
electronic service is thin."); Phillip K. Buhler, Transnational Services of Process
and Discovery in Federal Court Proceedings: An Overview, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1,
20 (2002) ("As service by e-mail is still in its formative stages even in domestic
litigation, this is best left to another discussion."); Susan Nauss Exon, The
Internet Meets Obi-Wan Kenobi in the Court of Next Resort, 8 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 1, 18 n.73 (2002) (proposing an international cyber-court that would
permit electronic service of process, but erroneously noting that FRCP 4(f) does
"not yet permit electronic service of process"); Major Mary J. Bradley, Calling
for a Truce on the Military Divorce Battlefield: A Proposal to Amend the
USFSPA, 168 MIL. L. REV. 40, 146 (2001) (suggesting that "[ellectronic service
of process will increase the efficiency of the [Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act] process"); Donald I. Baker et al., Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, 33 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1061, 1087 (2000) (arguing against the propriety of service of
process via e-mail in a fictional brief); Terrence P. McMahon, Plaintiffs
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1099, 1133 (2000) (arguing
in favor of service of process via e-mail in a fictional brief).
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II. ELECTRONIC SERVICE UPON PARTIES OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES IS PERMITTED UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
As discussed in Part III below, several recent federal
court decisions have permitted electronic service of process
on parties outside the United States. When ascertaining the
propriety of electronic service of process, courts examine
FRCP 4.39 FRCP 4(h)(2) authorizes service of process on
business entities outside the United States via the same
methods of service permissible for individuals provided by
FRCP 4(f), with the exception of personal delivery.4° FRCP
4(h)(2) provides in relevant part as follows:
(h) SERVICE UPON CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS. Unless
otherwise provided by federal law, service upon a domestic or
foreign corporation... from which a waiver of service has not been
obtained and filed, shall be effected: ... (2) in a place not within
any judicial district of the United States in any manner prescribed
for individuals by subdivision (fM except personal delivery as
provided in paragraph 2(C)(i) thereof.
Accordingly, FRCP 4(f) prescribes the methods of
service for individuals and corporations outside the United
States.41 FRCP 4(f) provides in relevant part that:
(f) SERVICE UPON INDIVIDUALS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY. Unless
otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from
whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than an
39. See infra Part III.
40. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(h)(2); Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d
1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002); Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456, 459
(S.D. Fla. 1998).
41. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(f). See generally 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, §§
1133-34 (discussing FRCP 4(f)(3)). Notably, FRCP 4 addresses service of
individuals and corporate entities outside of the United States, which is not to
say that such individuals must be foreign citizens or entities. Compare FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(f)(1) advisory committee notes (1993) ("This subdivision provides for
service on individuals who are in a foreign country.") (emphasis added) and
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(h)(2) (permitting "service upon a domestic or foreign
corporation") (emphasis added) with Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1015 (noting that
FRCP 4(f)(3) provides one of several means of "service of process on an
international defendant") (emphasis added). The ambiguity of "international
defendant" in Rio Properties, however, may have been unintentional. In any
event, such an interpretation would not be supported by either FRCP 4(h)(2) or
FRCP 4()(3).
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infant or an incompetent person, may be effected in a place not
within any judicial district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to
give notice, such as those means authorized by the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents; or
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the
applicable international agreement allows other means of service,
provided that service is reasonably calculated to give notice: (A) in
the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service
in that country in an action in any of its courts of general'
jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the foreign authority in response
to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or (C) unless prohibited by
the law of the foreign country by (i) delivery to the individual
personally of a copy of the summons and the complaint; or (ii) any
form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as
may be directed by the court.
In other words, subsection (f)(1) permits service by any
means established by international agreement 42-such as
the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents' 3-where such means are
"reasonably calculated to give notice"" to the defendant.45
42. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f)(1) ("internationally agreed means") and
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2) (same) with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3) ("international
agreement"). This article assumes that "international agreement" is
synonymous with "internationally agreed means." Such terms, however, are
somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear that an "international agreement" must be
a treaty, but such appears to be the case inasmuch as FRCP 4(f)(1) uses the
Hague Convention as an example of "internationally agreed means." FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(f)(1).
43. See Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, art. 1, 20 U.S.T. 361,
658 U.N.T.S. 163 (hereinafter "Hague Convention"), available at http:/!
www.hcch.net/e/conventions/textl4e.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2003): see
generally Buhler, supra note 38, at 9-12 (discussing service of process under the
Hague Convention).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). FRCP 4(f) expressly requires methods of service to
be "reasonably calculated to give notice"-which is the constitutional standard
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Where no treaty exists or a treaty is silent as to appropriate
methods of service, subsection (f)(2) permits service by: (A)
any method provided by local foreign law; (B) letter
rogatory;46 or (C) where not prohibited by local law, by
personal service or "any form of mail" dispatched by the
clerk of the court requiring a signed receipt.47 Finally,
subsection (f)(3) permits service by "other means" so long as
such means are "not prohibited by international agreement"
and are "directed by the court."
48
Notably, service pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3) stands on
equal footing with service pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(1) or
4(f)(2).49 In Rio Properties, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that service under FRCP 4(f)(3) is "neither a
'last resort' nor 'extraordinary relief" that may only be used
after service is attempted under either FRCP 4(f)(1) or
4(f)(2).7° Indeed, the Ninth Circuit noted that, "court-
directed service under Rule 4()(3) is as favored as service
available under Rule 4(f)(1) or Rule 4(f)(2) .... [Inasmuch
as] Rule 4(f)(3) is one of three separately numbered
subsections in Rule 4(f) ... [separated] by the simple
conjunction 'or. '51 Consequently, it seems likely that
under the Due Process Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mullane.
Id.
45. Id.
46. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 916 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "letters
rogatory/letter of request" as a "document issued by one court to a foreign court,
requesting that the foreign court: (1) take evidence from a specific person within
the foreign jurisdiction or serve process on an individual or corporation within
the foreign jurisdiction; and (2) return the testimony or proof of service for use
in a pending case").
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2)(c)(ii).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3). One court has noted that "[bly design, the
contours of FRCP 4(f)(3) are not precisely demarcated." Smith v. The Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan, Nos. 01 CIV. 10132 (HB), 01 CIV. 10144 (HB), 2001
WL 1658211, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) (permitting service via publication
upon Osama Bin-Laden and Al Qaeda pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3)).
49. See Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Intl Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that FRCP 4(f)(3) "is merely one means among several which
enables service of process on an international defendant").
50. Id. at 1014-15 (rejecting defendant's argument that FRCP 4(f) "should be
read to create a hierarchy of preferred methods of service of process" because
such an interpretation is unsupported by the text of the rule or "even hinted at
in the advisory committee notes").
51. Id. at 1015 ("Rule 4(f)(3) is not subsumed within or in any way
dominated by Rule 4(0's other subsections; it stands independently, on equal
footing. Moreover, no language in Rules 4(f)(1) or 4(f)(2) indicates their primacy,
and certainly Rule 4(f)(3) includes no qualifiers or limitations which indicate its
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litigants will attempt to use "other means" of service, such
as electronic service, under FRCP 4(f)(3) because such
means will often be easier and less expensive than more
traditional means of service.52
Courts permitting electronic service of process on
parties outside the United States have relied on FRCP
4(f)(3).53 Once a federal court directs electronic service, the
only remaining hurdle 4 under FRCP 4(f)(3) provides that
the method so directed "not [be] prohibited by international
agreement."55 So long as the authorized method of service is
availability only after attempting service of process by other means."); see also
Forum Fin. Group, LLC v. Harvard Coll., 199 F.R.D. 22, 23 (D. Me. 2001) ("By
its plain language and syntax, Rule 4(f)(3)'s alternative is not a last resort, nor
is it any less favored than service under subsections (1) and (2).").
52. See Cantor, supra note 38, at 944, 958, 966.
53. See infra Part III. Although Rio Properties stated that "email service is
not available absent a Rule 4(f)(3) court decree," Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018, it
is nonetheless conceivable that a court could rely on FRCP 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) in the
event that: (1) "any form of mail" is interpreted to include e-mail; and (2) the
clerk of the court dispatches the e-mail using a program that requires an
electronic signature by the recipient. Cf Cantor, supra note 38, at 960 (noting
that the clerk's office could issue an e-summons, which the plaintiff could then
forward to the defendant). Congress has defined "electronic signature" as an
"electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a
contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to
sign the record." 15 U.S.C. § 7006 (2001). Service under FRCP 4(f)(2)(C)(ii)
would only be available where there is no applicable international agreement or
where an applicable international agreement "allows other means of service."
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2); see also infra notes 65-67 (discussing the Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory). At least one commentator has expressed
doubt with respect to the likelihood that courts would construe "mail" within
the meaning of the FRCP to encompass e-mail. See Cantor, supra note 38, at
956-62 (suggesting that courts are not likely to accept that electronic mail is
"mail" under rules governing notice procedures, but noting that e-mail
distributed by the United States Postal Service would stand a better chance of
being construed as "mail").
54. See generally supra Part I and infra Parts III-IV (discussing the
requirement that service satisfy the Due Process Clause).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3); see also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1014 ("As obvious
from its plain language, service under Rule 4(f)(3) must be (1) directed by the
court; and (2) not prohibited by international agreement. No other limitations
are evident from the text."); Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Nos.
01 CIV. 10132 (HB), 01 CIV. 10144 (HB), 2001 WL 1658211, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 26, 2001) (noting that the "only limit on a court's discretion" is that the
method of service is not prohibited by international agreement); Mayoral-Amy
v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456, 460 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (declining to "exercise the
authority seemingly granted to it by Rule 4(f)(3), which appears to allow
[district courts] to unilaterally define an appropriate method for service in the
absence of a clear international standard").
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not prohibited by international agreement, it need not
comply with foreign law. 6 Thus, in many instances, courts
must examine the Hague Convention to ascertain whether
to permit electronic service of process.
The Hague Convention neither explicitly authorizes nor
explicitly prohibits service of process by e-mail. 7 This,
however, is not surprising since the Hague Convention was
promulgated in 1965.5 Article 10(a) of the Hague
Convention permits litigants to "send judicial documents,
by postal channels, directly to persons abroad" if the "State
of destination does not object."59 Consequently, the Hague
56. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1014 ("In fact, as long as court-directed and
not prohibited by an international agreement, service of process ordered under
Rule 4(f)(3) may be accomplished in contravention of the laws of the foreign
country."); see also Mayoral-Amy, 180 F.R.D. at 459 n.4 (noting that FRCP
4(f)(3) "does not necessarily preclude this Court from issuing such an order in
contradiction to the law of a foreign state"). If the method of service is not
prohibited by the law of the foreign country where service is being effected,
however, the plaintiff may have more difficulty enforcing judgment in such a
country. See Forum Fin. Group, 199 F.R.D. at 25.
57. See Hague Convention, supra note 43, 20 U.S.T. at 361; see also Charles
T. Kotuby, Jr., Note, International Anonymity: The Hague Conventions on
Service And Evidence and their Applicability to Internet-Related Litigation, 20
J.L. & COM. 103, 111 (2000) ("As the Hague Service Convention was adopted
over thirty-five years ago, none of the specified methods of transmission refers
expressly to the use of electronic media, such as e-mail, the Internet or facsimile
machines."). Although some courts have found that the Hague Convention does
not permit service by mail, the majority of courts have held that it does. See
Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that article 10(a)
of the Hague Convention permits service by registered mail); see also Alexandra
Amiel, Note, Recent Developments in the Interpretation of Article 10(a) of the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 387,
388 (2001) (noting that "U.S. courts are witnessing a contemporary trend where
a majority of decisions have held that Article 10(a) allows for service of process
by mail"). No published opinion in the United States, however, has examined
whether section 10(a) permits electronic service. Cf WAWA, Inc. v.
Christensen, No. Civ. A. 99-1454, 1999 WL 557936, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. July 27,
1999) (finding that service by e-mail was improper under the FRCP and that
service by mail was proper under section 10(a) of the Hague Convention, but
not addressing electronic service under the Hague Convention).
58. See Hague Convention, supra note 43, 20 U.S.T. at 361; see also Kotuby,
supra note 57, at 111; Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50
(1997) (noting that the Internet is an outgrowth of the ARPANET-a military
communication system established in 1969 designed to maintain military
communications during a war).
59. Hague Convention, supra note 43, art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363; see also 4B
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1134 (discussing service of process under
section 10(a) of the Hague Convention).
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Convention may permit service by electronic means to the
extent that such means constitute "postal channels" within
the meaning of article 10(a)." Inasmuch as the Hague
60. It is arguable that article 10(a) of the Hague Convention permits service
by e-mail to the extent that "postal channels" may be interpreted to include e-
mail. Although e-mail was not yet born in 1965, use of "postal channels"-which
is broader than "mail"-indicates an intent to include channels in addition to
mail, and thus arguably includes e-mail. See Kotuby, supra note 57, at 111
(noting that a 1999 roundtable discussion of "national representatives of
member states to the Hague Conference pondered the issue of electronic service
under the Convention... [and] noted that the language of the Convention is
neutral as to the communication method to be used ... [which] allows the
Convention to adjust with technological progress."); see also id. at 114-20
(discussing the possibility that e-mail could be construed as a "postal channel"
within the meaning of the Hague Convention); Conley, supra note 35, at 414
(noting that the drafter's of Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention "did not
mean the term 'send' only in the narrow sense of registered mail; it also meant
the term to include service by telegram."); cf. Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 94
N.Y.2d 242, 248 (2000) (noting that e-mail is an "evolutionary hybrid of
traditional telephone line communications and regular postal service mail");
Cantor, supra note 38, at 956-58 (suggesting that the term "mail" in state long-
arm statutes could be construed to encompass e-mail, but noting that courts
have held that electronic forms of communication do not constitute "mail"
within the meaning of FRCP 4). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the
Hague Convention is "mandatory in all cases to which it applies" and that it
applies where the law of the forum requires the transmittal of judicial
documents abroad. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S.
694, 704-06 (1988). To the extent that electronic service does not constitute
"transmittal abroad," the Hague Convention would be inapplicable. Such,
however, seems unlikely. Nonetheless, Volkswagenwerk suggests that a forum
could obviate the Hague Convention procedures by requiring foreign nationals
doing business (including e-business) in the forum to register with an electronic
agent for service of process. In any event, although the Hague Convention does
not expressly prohibit electronic service, it may implicitly prohibit electronic
service of process. Amiel, supra note 57, at 390-92 (citing Volkswagenwerk).
Indeed, Article 1 of the Hague Convention contains mandatory language where
it states that it "shall apply in all cases.., where there is occasion to transmit a
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad." Hague Convention, supra
note 43, art. 1, 20 U.S.T. at 362; see Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699 (citing article 1
and holding that the Hague Convention preempts inconsistent methods of
service); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 639-41 (5th Cir. 1994)
(same). Accordingly, the Hague Convention supplies the only permissible
methods of service abroad in signatory nations where the Hague Convention is
applicable. See Amiel, supra note 57, at 389 n.21 (listing forty signatories to the
Hague Convention). As noted above, however, the Hague Convention is not
applicable where the law of the forum does not require the transmittal abroad
of judicial documents. Moreover, Article 1 provides that the Hague Convention
"shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document
is not known." Hague Convention, supra note 43, art. 1. Accordingly, the Hague
Convention does not appear to prohibit electronic service of process where the
address of the party to be served is unknown-as is often the case where courts
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Convention arguably permits electronic service, and, in any
event, does not expressly prohibit it, electronic service
appears to be permissible under FRCP 4(f)(3). The advisory
committee's notes for FRCP 4(f)(3) confirm as much by
stating that "the court may direct a special method of
service not explicitly authorized by international agreement
if not prohibited by the agreement."6 Accordingly, the
Hague Convention does not appear to be an obstacle to
electronic service effected pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3).6 2
The Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory
("IACLR"),63 another relevant international agreement, "
provides that "letters rogatory may be transmitted."6"
Courts have construed such language to mean that the
IACLR only provides one method of service, but "does not
authorize electronic service. See infra Parts III and IV (discussing instances
where courts have authorized electronic service of process on parties located
outside the United States). In any event, as noted above, e-mail should be
construed as a "postal channel" because it exhibits the characteristics of a
"postal channel" and provides a simpler way of effectively serving defendants
abroad that ensures that defendants receive actual and timely notice to the
same extent (and perhaps more so) as service by mail. See, e.g.,
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 698 (1988) (noting that the
Hague Convention "was intended to provide a simpler way to serve process
abroad, to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive
actual and timely notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad");
Kotuby, supra note 57, at 111 (same); Amiel, supra note 57, at 407 (noting that
the "recent trend illustrates that courts are broadening the interpretation of
methods of service under the Hague Convention").
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3) advisory committee's note (1993).
62. Although the Hague Convention "pre-empts inconsistent methods of
service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies," Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 486 U.S. at 699, it only applies when serving parties
abroad-but not when serving foreign nationals in the United States. Id. at
707-08. Accordingly, to the extent that a court would construe electronic service
as effecting service within the United States, the Hague Convention would not
be applicable.
63. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, Jan. 30, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 339 (entered into force Jan. 16, 1976) (reprinted following 28 U.S.C. §
1781) (hereinafter "IACLR"), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
treaties/b-36.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
64. See generally Bubler, supra note 38, at 13-14 (discussing the IACLR);
Anne-Marie Kim, Note, The Inter-American Convention and Additional Protocol
on Letters Rogatory: The Hague Service Convention's "Country Cousins"?, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 687 (1998) (same); Kim M. Forcino, Note,
International Service of Process: The Trend Moves Away from Uniformity, 8
PACE INT'L L. REV. 485 (1996) (same).
65. IACLR, supra note 63, art. 4 (emphasis added).
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preempt all other means of service."6' Accordingly,
electronic service of process is permissible under FRCP
4(f)(3) where directed by the court because neither the
Hague Convention nor the IACLR prohibits such service.
III. CASE LAW ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC SERVICE OF PROCESS
Courts... cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology.
No longer do we live in a world where communications are
conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam
ships. Electronic communication via satellite can and does provide
instantaneous transmission of notice and information. No longer
must process be mailed to a defendant's door when he can receive
complete notice at an electronic terminal inside his very office,
even when the door is steel and bolted shut.
6 7
Although several courts have recently permitted service
of process by, inter alia, e-mail and/or facsimile,68 a few
66. See Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 640-44 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the IACLR does not make letters rogatory the exclusive means of
serving process in the signatory countries because "nothing in the language of
the [IACLR] expressly reflects an intention to supplant all alternative methods
of service"); United States v. Padilla, No. Civ. S-01-2301 FCD/JF, 2002 WL
471838, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2002) (holding that service pursuant to FRCP
4(f)(3) is not prohibited by the IACLR, which "provides one method of service");
Hein v. Cuprum, S.A. de C.V., 136 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (same);
Pizzabiocche v. Vinelli, 772 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (same).
Kreimerman is the only federal appellate court to have addressed whether the
IACLR preempts other methods of service. Kreimerman, 22 F.3d at 637.
Kreimerman noted that the IACLR only addressed one method of service-as
opposed to the Hague Convention, which expressly applies in all cases "where
there is occasion to transmit a judicial ... document for service abroad." Id. at
639 (quoting article 1 of the Hague Convention).
67. New Eng. Merch. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 80-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). New England Merchants was the
first federal court decision to permit electronic service of process where it
authorized service via telex upon Iranian defendants whom plaintiff could not
serve due to the regime change in Iran. Id. Although "[slome commentators
have urged authorization of service by facsimile, most jurisdictions only
authorize the use of facsimile or service of process after the initial service of
summons and complaint." Perritt, supra note 7, at 32-33 (citing David A.
Sokasits, Note, The Long Arm of the Facsimile: Service of Process Using
Facsimile Machines, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 531, 539-43 (1990)
(promoting use of facsimile machines for serving initial process of summons and
complaint)); Conley, supra note 35, at 411-12 (discussing service by facsimile).
68. In 1996, the English High Court issued the first known judicial decision
permitting service of process by e-mail. See Conley, supra note 35, at 408-10
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federal court decisions did not share New England
Merchant's zeitgeist by declining to boldly go where no
other federal court has gone before-cyberspace.69 For
example, Columbia Insurance Co. v. SEESCANDY. COM ° is
one of the first published decisions to address electronic
service of process. Columbia Insurance Co., an assignee of
various trademarks related to See's Candy Shops, Inc.,
brought a trademark action against various owners of the
domain names seescandy.com and seecandys.com.71 The
defendants, however, were largely unknown because the
domain name registrations held little information other
than e-mail addresses.72 Consequently, plaintiff named
various unknown or John Doe defendants, whom plaintiff
attempted to serve via e-mail.73 The court, without any
analysis or citation of authority, concluded that service of
process via e-mail was "not sufficient to comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."74
Likewise, the court in WAWA, Inc. v. Christensen 5 also
held that FRCP 4 did not permit the use of e-mail as a
(discussing a 1996 English High Court case that permitted electronic service of
process upon a defendant known only by their e-mail address); Tamayo, supra
note 38, at 244-46 (same).
69. See Tamayo, supra note 38, at 250 (noting that the District Court for the
Northern District of California-in its Columbia Insurance Co. decision-
resisted "the modern approaches to electronic notice employed by the courts in
the British case"); see also Borninski v. Texas Instruments, 32 F. Supp. 2d 918,
920 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (noting that the magistrate judge previously denied
plaintiffs request to serve deposition notices via e-mail).
70. 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
71. Id. at 575.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 577-79.
74. Id. at 579; see also Tamayo, supra note 38, at 250-51 (noting that
Columbia Insurance Co. "held that service of process by e-mail to a defendant's
electronic address, when the plaintiff did not know the actual identity of the
defendant, was improper" and that plaintiffs "must ascertain the defendant's
name and address to serve the defendant with the summons and complaint in
compliance with Rule 4"). Nonetheless, the Columbia Insurance Co. Court noted
that plaintiffs attempted e-mail service demonstrated "that plaintiff has made
a good faith effort to specifically identify defendant and to serve notice on
defendant." Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579. Consequently, plaintiff was
permitted to engage in limited discovery in an attempt to discover defendants'
identities. Id. 579-81. Inasmuch as several defendants were located inside the
United States, FRCP 4(f)(3) was inapplicable. Id. at 579.
75. WAWA, Inc. v. Christensen, No. Civ. A.99-1454, 1999 WL 557936 (E.D.
Pa. July 27, 1999).
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method of service.76 The WAWA, Inc. Court invalidated
plaintiffs attempted service upon a Danish citizen via e-
mail and regular mail because of its belief that e-mail was
"not an approved method of service under" FRCP 4.7"
Although the court noted that the "Judicial Conference
Rules Committee has discussed and recommended a change
in [FRCP 4] to permit service by electronic transmission,""
it nonetheless concluded that, "at this time, email is not a
valid means for delivering a summons and complaint to a
defendant."79 Soon after WAWA, Inc. was decided, however,
a series of federal courts established a trend toward
authorizing service of process via e-mail on parties outside
the United States pursuant to FRCP 4(h)(2) and FRCP
4(f)(3).
In Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Telemedia Associates, Inc.),80
a bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Georgia
became the first federal court to permit service of process by
e-mail.8 Broadfoot was an adversary proceeding82 by a
Chapter 7 trustee against the debtor's former
officer/director, Diaz, for alleged mismanagement.
3
Pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3), the court permitted the trustee to
serve the summons and complaint upon Diaz via facsimile,
e-mail, and regular mail at Diaz's last known address on
76. Id. at *1-2. WAWA, Inc. involved, inter alia, alleged violations of the
Lanham Act and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. Id. at *1.
Plaintiff requested an injunction against any use of the "WAWAWA.COM"
domain name. Id.
77. Id. The court nonetheless found service upon the defendant by certified
mail to be appropriate under FRCP 4(f) and Article 10(a) of the Hague
Convention. Id. at *2.
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id.
80. 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
81. Id. at 717 ("[TIhe propriety of the Court's inclusion of electronic mail
among the alternative methods by which the trustee may serve process on Diaz
appears to be a matter of first impression."); id. at 719 (noting that its order
"authorizing service by electronic mail ... has little or no precedent in this or
any other Circuit"); id. at 721 n.5 (citing press accounts that discussed the
court's previous authorization of service by e-mail).
82. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "adversary
proceeding" in relevant part as a "lawsuit that is brought within a bankruptcy
proceeding, governed by special procedural rules, and based on conflicting
claims [usually] between the debtor (or the trustee) and a creditor or other
interested party").
83. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 715. The trustee asserted claims for, inter alia,
waste of corporate assets and breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
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the grounds that Diaz was a "moving target."84 Diaz,
however, failed to respond to the complaint and the trustee
sought a default judgment against Diaz.85 In deciding the
trustee's motion, the court reviewed its previous decision
authorizing the trustee to serve Diaz via e-mail, which it
characterized as a "matter of first impression."86
In reviewing the propriety of its previous order
authorizing electronic service on Diaz, the court discussed
its finding that Diaz was a "moving target" and that it was
"virtually impossible for the trustee to find [Diaz] and effect
service by any of the traditional means specified in the
[FRCP]." ' Although the trustee communicated with Diaz
concerning the bankruptcy proceeding (prior to the trustee's
filing of an adversary proceeding against Diaz), such
contacts were by telephone and Diaz refused to provide a
permanent phone number or address through which he
could be contacted.88 Diaz, however, did provide the trustee
with a permanent facsimile number and an e-mail address
indicating Diaz's preference "for communication by
facsimile and electronic mail."89 The court concluded that
"Diaz simply provided the trustee with an electronic
address rather than a traditional postal or street address.""
84. Id. at 715-18. Notably, the trustee served Diaz with the Order
authorizing electronic service along with the summons and the complaint, thus
demonstrating that such service bore the imprimatur of the court. Id. at 716.
Indeed, service of such an order would likely encourage a defendant to think
twice about ignoring a summons to the extent that they would otherwise be
inclined to ignore the summons if they perceived that it was not validly served.
85. Id. at 717; see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Rivera, No. 99-CV-
983E, 2002 WL 1677699, at *1-2. (W.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002) (describing the
bifurcated process for obtaining a default judgment under FRCP 55).
86. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 715-17. Before reviewing the adequacy of e-mail
service, the court first examined whether it had personal jurisdiction over Diaz,
concluding that it did. Id. at 717-18 (noting that "[blefore a default can be
entered, the court must have jurisdiction over the party against whom
judgment is sought, which also means that the party must have been effectively
served with process") (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 718 ("[N]otwithstanding the trustee's diligence, the physical
whereabouts of Diaz could not be ascertained in order to effect service of process
on him by traditional means."). The trustee, however, discovered that the debtor
leased Diaz a residence in Singapore, which was the last known address upon
which the trustee attempted service. Id. at 716-19.




Broadfoot held that FRCP 4(f)(3) permitted electronic
service of process.9 The Broadfoot Court noted that FRCP
4(f)(3) and its predecessor, FRCP 4(i)(1)(E), were adopted to
provide federal courts with "flexibility and discretion" in
selecting alternative methods of service of process in foreign
countries.9" Indeed, when Rule 4 was promulgated in 1963,
it provided five methods of service of process." The fifth
method for service of process under FRCP 4(i)(1)(E) "was a
residual method adopted for the express purpose of
'add[ing] flexibility by permitting the court by order to
tailor the manner of service to fit the necessities of a
particular case.' 9 4 The court found that this flexibility
continues in FRCP 4(f)(3).9" Accordingly, the court held that
FRCP 4(f)(3) provides courts with flexibility to adopt
methods of service "so long as the particular method of
service adopted is not contrary to international
agreement ....
In determining whether e-mail was a feasible method of
service, the court recognized that it was a cyber-trailblazer
where it stated that "any unspecified form of alternate
service usually has its genesis in untried or formerly
unapproved methodology."9 7 The court found service of
process by e-mail to be a logical extension of case law
permitting methods of service including, inter alia,
facsimile, publication, and ordinary mail pursuant to FRCP
4(f)(3) or its predecessor.98 Accordingly, the court held that
e-mail service was permitted under the circumstances
because e-mail and facsimile were the only means of
communicating with Diaz.9 Indeed, Diaz expressly directed
91. Id. at 721.
92. Id. at 719.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also infra Part II.
96. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 419.
97. Id. The court further noted that there were nearly 150 million Internet
users, and that to ignore such "would be akin to hiding one's head in the sand
." Id. (citing Cantor, supra note 38).
98. Id.; see, e.g., New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation
& Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 80-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (allowing service by
telex for Iranian defendants unable to be served due to regime change that was
hostile toward the United States); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1093 (2d Cir.
1987) (permitting service of process by publication in the International Herald
Tribune).
99. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 720.
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the trustee to communicate only through such means."'
Although the court noted that it was unaware of any
domestic precedent upon which to rely,'' the court reasoned
that FRCP 4 (f)(3) was sufficient authority as it provided "a
nonexhaustive list of alternative means by which service
can be authorized," and that such "flexibility necessarily
includes the utilization of modern communication
technologies to effect service when warranted by the
facts."'0 2 Moreover, the court distinguished WAWA, Inc. on
the ground that the plaintiff in that case failed to seek prior
approval of the court as required under FRCP 4(f)(3). 3
Broadfoot also held that service via e-mail comported
with the constitutional requirements of the Due Process
Clause, as interpreted by Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co.,' because e-mail service was "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections."'0 5 The
court reasoned that the methods of service used were the
methods of communication expressly preferred by the
defendant in his dealings with the plaintiff, and were thus
reasonably calculated to provide defendant with actual
notice of the suit and an opportunity to appear and
defend.' 6 The court also noted that facsimile and e-mail are
"commonplace in our increasingly global society" and that
"federal courts are not required to turn a blind eye to
100. Id. Consequently, the court may have deemed Diaz to have impliedly
consented to electronic service of process--despite his apparent attempts to
remain beyond the court's long-arm.
101. The court, however, noted that a 1996 English court decision was the
"only prior judicial decision authorizing service of process by electronic mail in
any jurisdiction. . ." Id. (citing Conley, supra note 35, at 427-28); see also
Conley, supra note 35, at 408-10 (discussing the 1996 English High Court case).
102. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 720.
103. Id. at 721 n.6. A closer reading of WAWA, Inc., however, indicates that
the holding was not as narrow as suggested by the Broadfoot Court. See WAWA,
Inc., 1999 WL 557936, at *1 ("Electronic mail ('email') is not an approved
method of service under [FRCP 4].").
104. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also infra Part I (discussing Mullane).
105. Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 721 (quoting Mullane).
106. See id. ("If any methods of communication can be reasonably calculated
to provide a defendant with real notice, surely those communication channels
utilized and preferred by the defendant himself must be included among
them.").
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society's embracement of such technological advances."'' 7
Accordingly, it appears that, under Broadfoot, service of
process via e-mail and/or facsimile can be constitutionally
permissible even without the defendant's express
preference for such methods of communication. 8
Broadfoot was undoubtedly a watershed case in the
area of electronic service of process. However, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Rio Properties1°9  is obviously of
paramount importance because it is the first federal
appellate court to address e-mail service of process on a
party outside the United States."' Rio Properties held that
107. Id. (quoting New Eng. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation
& Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
108. See id. (citing Conley, supra note 35 and its discussion of the English
High Court case as an example of where electronic service is permissible absent
an express indication by defendant that such electronic methods are acceptable
to them). It therefore appears that courts are willing to accept some degree of
risk that a defendant will not receive actual notice of a suit against them where
the circumstances are such that electronic service nonetheless provides the best
available option for service. Indeed, it appears that courts are unwilling to let
plaintiffs go unredressed merely because a defendant is not easily served. See
id. at 722 ("A defendant should not be allowed to evade service by confining
himself to modern technological methods of communication not specifically
mentioned in the Federal Rules. Rule 4(f)(3) appears to be designed to prevent
such gamesmanship by a party."); Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,
Nos. 01 Civ. 10132 (HB), 01 Civ. 10144 (HB), 2001.WL 1658211, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 26, 2001) ("Without proper service by [plaintiffs], this Court lacks personaljurisdiction over the defendants and is powerless to take further action in either
lawsuit."); Montesdeoca v. Krams, 755 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003)
(citing Rio Properties and Hollow for the proposition that "innocent parties need
not despair and judges do not have to twiddle their thumbs where an elusive
party attempts to barricade itself from service of process. The law will follow in
step in fashioning appropriate relief."). Accordingly, courts are more inclined to
permit non-traditional methods of service where necessary to serve parties over
whom the court may exert personal jurisdiction but over whom traditional
methods of service are futile. See id.
109. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also Jonathan A. Franklin & Roberta J. Morris, International Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in the Era of Global Networks: Irrelevance of, Goals
for, and Comments on the Current Proposals, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1213, 1262
n. 138 (2002) (citing Rio Properties without discussion).
110. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017 ("We acknowledge that we tread upon
untrodden ground. The parties cite no authority condoning service of process
over the Internet or via email, and our own investigation has unearthed no
decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals dealing with service of process
by email and only one case anywhere in the federal courts."); see also Service of
Process - Foreign Defendant - E-mail Service, FED. LITIGATOR 110, 111 (May
2002) (characterizing the holding in Rio Properties as "the first time a federal
appeals court has sanctioned service by e-mail").
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service by email and/or facsimile was allowed under FRCP
4(f)(3).111 Rio Properties, a Las Vegas hotel and casino
operator, sued Rio International Interlink, a Costa Rican
internet gambling operation, for, inter alia, trademark
infringement. 1 2 Prior to filing suit, plaintiff encountered
defendant's advertisements, inviting patrons to visit its
sportS gaming website, www.riosports.com." 3 Plaintiff sent
defendant a letter demanding that it cease operating the
site. 1 4 Defendant disabled the site, but resumed its
operation at www.betrio.com.115 Consequently, plaintiff filed
suit.
Although plaintiff was unable to locate defendant in the
United States to effect service, it discovered that
defendant's Miami address was an international courier
that was not authorized to accept service of process on
defendant's behalf."' Plaintiff nonetheless served the
summons and complaint on defendant's courier.1 7 The
summons and complaint reached defendant, who in turn
had an attorney contact plaintiffs counsel to inquire about
the suit."8 Although defense counsel asked for a legible
copy of the complaint, he declined to accept service of
process on behalf of his client."9 Undeterred, plaintiff
unsuccessfully attempted to locate defendant's Cost Rican
address, but discovered that defendant "preferred
communication through its email address,
email@betrio.com" and that it received regular mail at the
address of its international courier.2 Accordingly, plaintiff
"filed an emergency motion for alternate service of
process." 2' The district court granted plaintiffs motion and
authorized it to serve defendant through e-mail and its
international courier pursuant to FRCP 4(h)(2) and FRCP
4(f)(3).122 Default judgment was ultimately entered against
111. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016-17.









121.' Id. Defendant, however, did not respond. Id.




the defendant for failure to comply with the district court's
discovery orders.12 Defendant appealed, inter alia, the
sufficiency of service of process.
121
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, using the
deferential abuse of discretion standard, affirmed the
district court's authorization of e-mail service pursuant to
FRCP 4(h)(2) and FRCP 4(f)(3).'25 In affirming the district
court's authorization of service via e-mail, the Ninth Circuit
cited case law construing FRCP 4(f)(3) or its predecessor
that established a trend towards authorizing alternative
methods of service including telex and e-mail.'"6 The Ninth
Circuit held that service pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3) "is an
equal means of effecting service of process under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'27 The Ninth Circuit left
to the district court's discretion "the task of determining
when the particularities and necessities of a given case
require alternate service of process" under FRCP 4(f)(3)."'
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit expressly agreed with the
district court's use of its discretionary authority to select an
alternative method of service to remedy plaintiffs "inability
to serve an elusive international defendant, striving to
evade service of process" despite plaintiffs reasonable
attempts at service.1
29
After determining that e-mail service was permissible
under FRCP 4, the Ninth Circuit next ascertained whether
service via e-mail upon the defendant was constitutionally
permissible under Mullane."' Noting that the broad
standard enunciated in Mullane "unshackles the federal
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1014.
125. Id. at 1014-18 (disapproving of a contrary holding in Graval v. P.T.
Bakrie & Bros., 986 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit
distinguished WAWA, Inc. on the same grounds as the Broadfoot Court, namely,
that the plaintiff in WAWA, Inc. lacked a court order. Id. at 1018; see also infra
note 103 (discussing Broadfoot's discussion of WAWA, Inc.).
126. Id. at 1016 (citing, inter alia, New England Merchants and Broadfoot).
127. Id. at 1014-16 (holding that FRCP 4(f)(3) is not a "last resort" to be
used only when service has been attempted under either FRCP 4(f)(1) or FRCP
4(f)(2)).
128. Id. at 1018.
129. Id. at 1016. ("[Plaintiff] need not have attempted every permissible
means of service of process before petitioning the court for alternative relief.
Instead, [plaintiff] needed only to demonstrate that the facts and circumstances
of the present case necessitated the district court's intervention.").
130. Id. at 1016-18.
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courts from anachronistic methods of service and permits
them entry into the technological renaissance," 3' the Ninth
Circuit found, "[w]ithout hesitation," that each method
authorized by the district court was "reasonably calculated"
under the circumstances to apprise defendant of the suit
and afford it an opportunity to respond. 132 Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit found that service by e-mail was "the method of
service most likely to reach [defendant]' ' 133 because the
defendant had "embraced the modern e-business model
and .... [S]tructured its business such that it could be
contacted only via its email [sic] address."3 4 Moreover, the
defendant designated its e-nriail address as its "preferred
contact information" on its web site and on printed
advertisements.'35 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that
service by e-mail was constitutionally permissible under the
facts of the case.
36
Despite affirming service by e-mail, Rio Properties also
noted some potential limitations of electronic service."'
Such limitations included inability to confirm receipt of an
e-mail message, 3 ' limited use of electronic signatures, 9
131. Id. at 1017.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1017. The court noted that service by e-mail was the only method
"aimed directly and instantly at" the defendant, as opposed to an intermediary
such as defendant's attorney or international courier. Id. at 1018; see also
Tamayo, supra note 38, at 256 (suggesting that e-mail service is better than
other methods of substitute service because the lack of an intermediary
eliminates the risk of misplacement).
134. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017-18.
135. Id. at 1018.
136. Id. at 1017-18.
137. Id. at 1018.
138. Id.; see also Bowman v. Weeks Marine, Inc, 936 F. Supp. 329, 339
(D.S.C. 1996) (discussing the difficulties involved when confirming receipt of
pleadings by facsimile or e-mail for purposes of removal). Commentators
suggest that confirmation of receipt of electronic service is not as problematic as
Rio Properties suggests inasmuch as at least one company offers a service that
provides such confirmation. See Jenna Karadbil, Service by Email, NEV. LAW.,
July 2002, at 21, 31 ("[Tlhere is at least one company that provides proof of
service of documents sent via email. Proof of Service - electronic, www.pos-
e.com, offers, for a nominal fee, certified Internet document delivery and
provides proof of what was served, upon whom, and when."); Conley, supra note
35, at 409-10 (noting that defense counsel in the English High Court case used
an Internet service provider that notified the sender when the e-mail message
was received-but could not track when the message was read); id. at 424-25
(discussing issues related to the confirmation of receipt of electronic messages);
Tamayo, supra note 38, at 254-55 (suggesting ways to reduce the problems
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problems associated with the transmission, of exhibits,14°
and other issues that invariably arise when people interact
with computers.14'
Subsequent court decisions have relied on the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Rio Properties when authorizing
electronic service of process. For example, the court in Ryan
v. Brunswick Corp. et al.14 authorized electronic service
upon a Taiwanese manufacturer pursuant to FRCP
4(f)(3)."' Ryan was a personal injury action involving an
allegedly defective bicycle component." Plaintiff sued the
New York bicycle distributor and the Taiwanese component
manufacturer.'45  Plaintiff had difficulty serving the
Taiwanese manufacturer and suggested that the
associated with electronic service). Moreover, assuming that a plaintiff can
demonstrate that they sent a summons and complaint via e-mail and/or
facsimile, and that the address used is correct, the law should presume receipt
by the defendant. See id. at 256 (discussing the "law's presumption that papers
delivered are deemed read is illustrated [by] substituted service"); cf FED. R.
Civ. P. 5(b)(3) (making electronic service complete upon transmission except
where the sending party learns that the transmission did not reach the
recipient).
139. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018; but see Cantor, supra note 38, at 965
(discussing the reliability of digital signatures).
140. Even assuming that the transmission of exhibits was not
technologically feasible or that the defendant was unable to receive or open
such attachments, plaintiffs should be allowed to serve the complaint and
summons via e-mail, thereby providing defendant notice of the suit. To avoid
any problems with the transmission of exhibits, plaintiffs could indicate by
cover letter that defendant can contact plaintiff to make arrangements for
delivery of the attachments. Indeed, inasmuch as notice and an opportunity to
respond are the constitutional hallmarks required by the Due Process Clause, it
is not essential that all attachments are sent simultaneous with the complaint,
as long as the defendant is placed on notice and given the opportunity to obtain
any attachments. Indeed, FRCP 4(d)(2) provides that a defendant "that receives
notice of an action in the manner provided in this paragraph has a duty to avoid
unnecessary costs of serving the summons." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2).
141. Nonetheless, courts could take measures to guard against these
problems. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (indicating that it would be left to the
discretion of the district courts to "balance the limitations of email service
against its benefits in any particular case"); see also Cantor, supra note 38, at
961-62 (noting that plaintiffs could hedge against lost or deleted e-mails by
making electronic service undeletable for a period of time and/or placing the
complaint and summons on a web-site accessible to the defendant).
142. No. 02-CV-133(E)F, 2002 WL 1628933 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002).
143. Id. at *1-3. In so holding, Ryan followed the lead of Rio Properties and
Broadfoot. Id. at *2 nn. 5, 8.
144. Id. at *1 n.1.
145. Id. at *1.
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manufacturer could only be served by a letter rogatory. 146
Consequently, the plaintiff faced the possibility of being
unable to recover 100% of his damages if the manufacturer,
who had failed to appear despite plaintiffs attempts at
service of process, was 50% or more at fault.147 In an
attempt to avoid this result, the plaintiff sought to have the
distributor declared jointly and severally liable pursuant to
CPLR § 1602(10), which required %plaintiff to show "that
jurisdiction over the manufacturer could not with due
diligence be obtained.
148
-Rather than addressing whether plaintiffs attempts at
service constituted a failure to obtain jurisdiction over the
manufacturer with due diligence, the district court sua
sponte authorized plaintiff to serve the manufacturer
electronically pursuant to FRCP 4(h) and FRCP 4(f)(3). 149
The court relied on Rio Properties in holding that service by
"other means" under FRCP 4(f)(3) is allowed where such
service is "not prohibited by international agreement" and
is "directed by the court."5 Consequently, the plaintiff in
Ryan was permitted to serve process on the Taiwanese
manufacturer by, inter alia, e-mail, facsimile, and regular
mail pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3).51
Nonetheless, the Ryan Court also held that parties
could not whimsically seek to use "other means" of service
146. Id. at *1 n.4.
147. Plaintiff faced this situation because of New York's modified version of
the common law rule of joint and several liability set forth in § 1601(1) of New
York's Civil Procedure Law and Rules ("CPLR"). See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW
YORK PRACTICE §§ 168A-168E (3d ed. 1999) (discussing New York's modification
of the common law rule concerning joint and several liability); compare N.Y.
CPLR § 1601(1) (McKinney 1997) with N.Y. CPLR § 1602(10) (McKinney 1997).
Under CPLR § 1601(1), the distributor would only be "severally liable for
plaintiffs non-economic loss to the 'extent of [the distributor's] proportionate
share of fault where [it was] 50% or less at fault"-but would remain jointly and
severally liable for plaintiffs damages if it was 50% or more at fault. See Ryan,
2002 WL 1628933, at *1 n.3. On the other hand, CPLR § 1602(10) provided an
exception to the rule of CPLR § 1601(1) where a plaintiff can show that
jurisdiction over the defendant "cannot with due diligence be obtained." Id. at
*1.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *1-3; see also infra Part II.
150. Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (citing Rio Properties for the proposition
that FRCP 4(f)(3) is an "independent basis for service of process" that is not
"extraordinary relief" or a "last resort" that is only available when parties are
unable to effectuate service under subsections (f)(1) or (f)(2)).
151. Id.
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under FRCP 4(f)(3), and that district courts are impliedly
permitted to impose a threshold requirement under FRCP
4(f)(3).1 The Ryan Court stated that although parties "need
not exhaust all possible methods of service" before seeking
the court's assistance under FRCP 4(0)(3), they must
reasonably attempt to serve the defendant and present
circumstances where the "court's intervention is necessary
to obviate the need to undertake methods of service that are
unduly burdensome or that are untried but likely futile."1
Finally, Ryan concluded that electronic service upon the
manufacturer comported with due process requirements
under Mullane because the manufacturer encouraged
parties to conduct business with it via e-mail where it listed
its e-mail address on its web-site.5 4 Notably, however, the
Ryan Court did not require the degree of rascality that
existed in the Rio Properties case."
Addressing an issue of first impression under New York
law, the New York Supreme Court5 . for Oswego County
became the first New York state court to permit service of
process via e-mail in Hollow v. Hollow'-thereby
152. Id.
153. Id. Other district courts have imposed similar thresholds. See Elisan
Entm't, Inc. v. Suazo, 206 F.R.D. 335, 336 n.2 (D.P.R. 2002) (citing 4B WRIGHT
& MILLER § 1134 for the proposition that FRCP 4(f)(3) "permits service in a
particular case to be tailored to the necessities of the situation when none of the
other methods of service expressly provided for in the rule is satisfactory or
likely to be successful. .. ."); Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456, 460
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (declining to exercise its authority under FRCP 4(f)(3) to allow
service by facsimile on Belizean defendant where the plaintiff did not indicate
that he was "incapable of appropriately effectuating ... service" in Belize).
154. Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 ("Inasmuch as [the manufacturer]
conducts its business through these means of communication, such are
reasonably calculated to apprize [the manufacturer] of the pendency of this
action and afford it an opportunity to respond.").
155. Id. (noting that the defendant in Rio Props. was more "elusive" than
the Taiwanese defendant in Ryan). It appears that a court following Ryan
would permit electronic service where a foreign defendant ignores a plaintiffs
reasonable attempts to effectuate service-thereby attempting to avoid being
hauled into a court that likely has personal jurisdiction over it because of the
defendant's minimum contacts with the forum.
156. SIEGEL, supra note 147, § 12 ("The 'supreme' court is a misnomer. It is
not 'supreme.' It is two rungs below the state's court of last resort. It is,
however, the state's only court of 'general' jurisdiction.").
157. 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) ("This case presents a
fascinating issue of first impression in the State of New York, to wit, whether
under the circumstances presented, personal service can be affected through e-
mail?"); N.Y. Court Allows Service of Process by E-mail, 4 No. 2 ANDREWS E-Bus.
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continuing the federal trend.'58 In Hollow, plaintiffs
husband moved to Saudi Arabia in 1999 to work for an
engineering firm.'59  The only contact that plaintiffs
husband had with her after he relocated to Saudi Arabia
was via e-mail. 161 In June of 2000, plaintiffs husband sent
her an email that stated "I am a resident of Saudi Arabia
and there's nothing anyone can do to me here."'' Plaintiff
subsequently commenced a divorce action against her
husband in May of 2001.162 Plaintiffs counsel unsuccessfully
attempted to serve the defendant through an international
process server. 6 3 The international process server, however,
informed plaintiff that the only method of service available
was the lengthy and expensive process of obtaining letters
rogatory16 and that personal service would be "virtually
impossible" because defendant resided and worked on a
company-owned compound.'65  Moreover, defendant's
L. BULL. 9 (2002) (noting that Hollow was the first New York state court
decision to allow service of process by e-mail); cf Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Special
Report: The State of the Judiciary, 70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 50, 50 (May/June 1998)
(noting that the New York court system "will continue to seek statutory reforms
for litigation in the electronic age-like service of process by facsimile and e-
mail"). Other recent decisions in New York have also addressed electronic
service. See GMA Accessories, Inc. v. Megatoys, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 17743(LAK),
2003 WL 193507, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2003) (noting that a court order is
required for service by e-mail); Maddaloni Jewelers, Inc. v. Rolex Watch USA,
Inc., No. 02 Civ. 6438(SAS), 2002 WL 31509881, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2002)
(holding that defendant's receipt of complaint via e-mail did not start the clock
for purposes of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because defendants did not
consent to service by e-mail); People v. Welch, 738 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2002) (holding that e-mail did not constitute "written notice" within the
meaning of CPL 190.50[5] [a]). Nonetheless, it appears that-under Maddaloni
Jewelers-a party may consent to service of process via e-mail, as long as such
consent is clear, but not necessarily in writing. See Maddaloni Jewelers, 2002
WL 31509881, at *2-4. New York courts have also held that service of papers
upon an attorney by facsimile satisfies CPLR § 2103. See Calabrese v. Springer
Pers. of N. Y., 534 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) ("Startling as it may seem,
however, no published opinion has been found considering the applicability of
facsimile machines to the conduct of litigation.").
158. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (citing Rio Properties and Broadfoot).




163. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
164. Id.
165. Id. Plaintiffs process server also indicated that it risked criminal
charges if it attempted to serve the security guards at the company compound.
Id.
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employer refused to accept service of process on defendant's
behalf.'66 Consequently, plaintiff sought either an extension
of time to serve process or authorization to serve defendant
via e-mail.'67
The court allowed plaintiff to serve defendant via e-mail
pursuant to CPLR § 308(5) because it found that service
upon the defendant was impracticable. 18  In approving
166. Id.
167. Id. Plaintiff moved for an alternate method of service pursuant to
CPLR § 308(5). See generally SIEGEL, supra note 147, § 75 (discussing court-
ordered service under § 308(5)). Courts may permit an alternate method of
service under CPLR § 308(5) where service is "impracticable" under the
previous sections of CPLR 308. See id. Where such impracticability exists, a
plaintiff may make an ex parte motion asking the court to authorize an
alternate method of service. See id. Indeed, Professor Siegel notes that a "court
can by order direct any kind of service it wishes, restricted only by the basic
demands of due process, the facts of the particular case, and the judge's
imagination." Id. Accordingly, CPLR § 308(5) appears to operate in a manner
similar to that of FRCP 4(f)(3), except that CPLR § 308(5) is not restricted to
use outside the United States.
168. See Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 706 ("Although a showing of
impracticability does not require proof of due diligence or actual attempts to
serve a party under each and every method prescribed in CPLR 308... ,the
movant will be required to make a competent showing as to the actual prior
efforts that were made to effect service.") (emphasis added and citations
omitted); see also id. at 706 n.1 ("'Resort to CPLR § 308[5] is intended for
'unpredictable circumstances,' in which the inability to accomplish service via
other methods of service, as fashioned by the court in the exercise [of its
discretion, under the particular circumstances of the case.'") (citation omitted).
The Hollow decision introduces the possibility of electronic service of process
within the State of New York pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1), which permits service
upon individuals "pursuant to the law of the state" where the district court is
located or where "service is effected." FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e)(1). Although Hollow
involved service upon a foreign defendant, such was not necessary to its
holding. Indeed, the court merely found that service was impracticable-albeit
due to an evasive defendant hiding in a foreign country. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d
at 706. Accordingly, pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(1) and CPLR § 308(5), a federal
court in New York could permit electronic service anywhere in the United
States where service is impracticable-subject to Mullane. Cf Georgiu v.
Sterling Mounting & Finishing, No. 00-7160, 2001 WL 30648, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan.
9, 2001) (holding that FRCP 4(e)(1) permits service "in any judicial district of
the United States ... pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court
is located"); Puccio v. Town of Oyster Bay, 229 F. Supp. 2d 173, 176 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (same); cf. Cantor, supra note 38, at 956, 961 (suggesting that service
could be effected under FRCP 4(e)(1) where state law permits mail service and
where e-mail constitutes "mail" under the applicable state law); Kotuby, supra
note 57, at 108 (same). In other words, under FRCP 4(e)(1), electronic service
may be effected within New York State (if service is effected within the state) or
anywhere in the United States (if the action is pending in a federal court in
New York) where such is impracticable under CPLR §308(5). See 4B WRIGHT &
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service of process on the defendant in Saudi Arabia via e-
mail, the court discussed Rio Properties and Broadfoot.'69
Although the court indicated that it was "cognizant of the
concerns associated with service by e-mail, including the
difficulty of verifying the defendant's receipt of the
message . . .", it nonetheless held that service of process via
e-mail was constitutionally adequate. 7 ' Indeed, the court
held that "a constitutionally proper method of effecting
substituted service need not guarantee that in all cases the
defendant will in fact receive actual notice"-as long as the
method of service is "reasonably calculated... to apprise
the interested party of the pendency of the action."7 '
Consequently, the court did not hesitate in allowing service
via e-mail because e-mail was the mode of communication
adopted by the defendant."2 The court therefore directed
plaintiff to serve defendant at his last-known e-mail
address and by "international registered air mail and
international mail standard."7 3
MILLER, supra note 5, §§ 1112, 1115 (discussing FRCP 4(e)(1) and noting that
FRCP 4(e)(1) "allows service pursuant to state law to be made in any judicial
district of the United States"). Additionally, electronic service under FRCP
4(e)(1) could also be allowed if the relevant state long-arm statute permits it.
Cantor, supra note 38, at 956, 961. For example, a state long-arm statute could
require corporations doing business in the state to accept electronic service
through a registered agent or at a designated corporate e-mail address. See
Tamayo, supra note 38, at 252, 256; Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil
Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516,
1534 (1998) (suggesting that corporate entities could be required to register
electronic addresses for service of process).
169. See Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
170. Id. at 708.
171. Id. at 708 (citing Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 502 (N.Y. 1968),
and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
172. See id. at 708 (noting that "the defendant has in essence, secreted
himself behind a steel door, bolted shut, communicating with the plaintiff and
his children exclusively through e-mail"); see also id. at 708 n.3 (quoting
Broadfoot for the proposition that "[i]f any methods of communication can be
reasonably calculated to provide a defendant with real notice, surely those
communication channels utilized and preferred by the defendant himself must
be included among them").
173. See id. at 708.
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IV. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH COURTS HAVE
PERMITTED ELECTRONIC SERVICE OF PROCESS OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES
Courts have permitted electronic service of process on
parties located outside the United States pursuant to FRCP
4(h)(2) and FRCP 4(f)(3) where some combination of the
following circumstances were present.14 First, the proposed
methods of service are reasonably calculated to provide the
defendant with notice."' Second, traditional methods of
service are, or are likely to prove, futile or inadequate.176
174. See supra Part III.
175. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016-19 (9th
Cir. 2002); Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc.), 245 B.R. 713,
721-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000); Ryan v. Brunswick, No. 02-CV-133(E)F, 2002
WL 1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002); Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 707-08.
Indeed, any method of service must satisfy the constitutional mandates set
forth in Mullane. See supra Parts I and III (discussing Mullane). Notably,
however, Mullane does not require actual notice and is sufficiently flexible to
accommodate electronic service. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 319 (1950) (holding
that "notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information ... and must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make
their appearance ... [blut if with due regard for the practicalities and
peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the constitutional
requirements are satisfied" and noting that the "statutory notice to known
beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach everyone")
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (noting that
"[i]t is hornbook law that a constitutionally proper method of effectuating
service need not guarantee that in all cases the defendant will in fact receive
actual notice") (citations omitted). Indeed, Mullane held that the
"reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method [of
service] may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to
inform those affected .... " Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added); Cantor,
supra note 38, at 964-65 (noting that actual service is not required and
contending that Internet service is constitutional under Mullane and that it
may often be superior to other forms of service). The Court then stated that
"where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice [by regular mail], that
the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other
of the feasible and customary substitutes." Mullane, 339 U.S. 315. Accordingly,
it appears that the Mullane Court envisioned the possibility of alternative
substitute forms of service in the future.
176. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016 (holding that the plaintiff did not have
to attempt "every permissible means of service" because it only needed to
demonstrate "that the facts and circumstances ... necessitated the district
court's intervention"); Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 718-19; Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933,
at *2 ("[A]lthough a party need not exhaust all possible methods of service ...
[parties must] show that they have reasonably attempted to effectuate service
on the defendant(s) and that the circumstances are such that the district court's
intervention is necessary to obviate the need to undertake methods of service
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This "futility" factor is often the result of the third factor, to
wit, that the defendant is hard to find because it: (1) is
unknown; (2) has unknown whereabouts; (3) is a "moving
target"; and/or (4) is evading service to some degree.
Finally, courts have permitted electronic service where the
defendant has relied on electronic methods of
communication such as e-mail-either with the plaintiff in
particular or with potential customers in general. 178 For
example, the defendant in Broadfoot did not consent to
electronic service, but he consented to have the plaintiff
contact him via facsimile and e-mail, prompting the court to
find that electronic service was "reasonably calculated" to
notify defendant of the pending suit. 9 Although courts
have found a defendant's preference for electronic
communication significant, courts have not expressly
analyzed such preferences in terms of implied consent."'
For example, it could be argued that the defendants in
Broadfoot and Hollow impliedly consented to electronic
that are unduly burdensome or that are untried but likely futile."); Hollow, 747
N.Y.S.2d at 708 (noting that "the defendant has in essence, secreted himself
behind a steel door, bolted shut, communicating with the plaintiff and his
children exclusively through e-mail"); see also Conley, supra note 35, at 409
(noting that the English High Court case permitted electronic service where "it
was absolutely impossible to reach the defendant by any traditional means
since the defendant's location was not identifiable").
177. See Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 718-19; Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016; Ryan,
2002 WL 1628933, at *2; Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 708. See also New Eng.
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F.
Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[Iran's] conduct can only be interpreted as an
intentional avoidance ... of service of process in an effort to frustrate the
instant suits. Justice demands that a substitute form of service be formulated
one calculated to provide defendants with adequate notice of the pendency and
nature of the instant suits." (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)); Conley, supra note 35, at 409.
178. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017-18; Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 721-22;
Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (noting that the defendant "conducts its business
through [electronic] means of communication"); Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 708;
Conley, supra note 35, at 409 (noting that the defendant in the English High
Court case favored e-mail communication with the plaintiff in extorting
plaintiff).
179. See Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 718 (finding that defendant indicated a
preference for communicating by facsimile and e-mail). One could also imagine
circumstances under which a defendant expressly consents to electronic service.
See Tamayo, supra note 38, at 253 (suggesting that parties incorporate
electronic service requirements in contracts). Indeed, such facts would likely
assist a court to find electronic service to* be constitutional under the Due
Process Clause.
180. See supra Part III.
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service by expressly consenting to engage in electronic
communication with the respective plaintiffs.181 Likewise,
inasmuch as the defendants in Rio Properties and Ryan
encouraged parties to conduct business with them on the
internet and/or via e-mail,182 the courts may have construed
such e-invitations as implied consent to have all
communications directed. to them electronically, including
service of process."8 '
V. DOMESTIC ELECTRONIC SERVICE OF PROCESS: A
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
The trend toward electronic service of process has been
described by one commentator as "a logical step forward in
the evolution of civil procedure and reflects the popular use
of new technologies in common communication."1"4 Service
of process in the nineteenth century generally required
personal service in the forum.181 This standard, however,
soon became obsolete because of increased inter-
jurisdictional contacts among people and entities.'86
Consequently, civil procedure evolved in the mid-twentieth
century, as demonstrated by such cases as International
Shoe and Mullane. Under the modern standards, personal
181. See Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 721-22; Hollow, 747 N.Y.S. 2d at 708.
182. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017-18; Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2.
183. Although it is doubtful that defendants actually anticipated that their
electronic communications subjected them to electronic service of process,
courts would be justified in finding implied consent inasmuch as the law will
not tolerate defendants who intentionally structure their business and/or
relationships in an attempt to avoid courts' long-arm reach. See, e.g., Rio Props.,
284 F.3d at 1017-21 (finding that the defendant was subject to electronic service
of process and suit in the forum despite its attempts to evade "presence" in the
forum by maintaining an exclusively on-line presence); Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315-21 (1945) (finding that defendant was subject to
suit in the forum despite its attempt to structure its business in a manner that
avoided "presence" within the meaning of the previously prevailing territorial
concept of personal jurisdiction established by Pennoyer). Some commentators
suggest that cyberspace is a "place" for analytical purposes. See Giordano, supra
note 1, at 4 n.10 (comparing David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and
Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) with
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996)). As
noted above, however, courts have not adopted this theoretical construct,
instead finding that a defendant's on-line presence constitutes presence within
the forum where sufficient minimum contacts exist.
184. Conley, supra note 35, at 407.
185. See supra Part I (discussing Pennoyer).
186. See supra Part I.
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jurisdiction exists where a party maintains "minimum
contacts" with the forum187 and such parties can be served
by methods "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise them of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."188 Likewise, inter-jurisdictional contacts among
people and entities have increased at an unprecedented
rate during the end of the twentieth century and start of
the twenty-first century, spurred in large part by the
advent of e-mail and other forms of electronic
communication.'89 Consequently, civil procedure is once
again evolving in response to such globalization.9 0 This
evolution, however, is ongoing.
187. See supra Part I (discussing International Shoe).
188. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
189. Conley, supra note 35, at 407 ("Technology has progressed to a point
where the traditional limitations of geography have been overcome through the
use of alternative forms of communication, such as facsimile machines,
electronic mail, [and] the Internet..."); see Samuel A. Thumma & Darrel S.
Jackson, A History of Electronic Mail in Litigation, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1-4 (1999) (describing the meteoric rise in the volume of e-
mails during the 1980's and 1990's); Perritt, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that "the
new technologies may open up international commerce to types of transactions
that heretofore mostly occurred only within a single country. For these reasons,
the [internet] will force the international legal community at least to modify the
way in which it deals with transnational conflict."); Calabrese v. Springer Pers.
of N.Y., 534 N.Y.S.2d 83, 83 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (noting that in 1988 facsimiles
had "become overwhelmingly the method of choice for the transmission of
documents in today's world" and that facsimile machines had "become so
widespread that business stationary now commonly carries a 'facsimile'
telephone number.. ."). But see Salley v. Bd. of Governors, 136 F.R.D. 417, 419
(M.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that facsimile delivery of discovery requests did not
satisfy FRCP 5(b) even though "service by facsimile may be the wave of the
future"-the court left it to the Advisory Committee to amend FRCP 5(b)-
which did so in 2001); United States v. Galiczynski, 44 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 n.6
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that FRCP 5(b) did not permit service by facsimile but
noting that "movement towards permitting service by electronic means is afoot
in the federal system").
190. See supra Part III (discussing case law that has permitted electronic
service of process. Frank Conley described the response of civil procedure to the
growth of a more computer-friendly society as follows:
Just as the evolution from ... personal service of process, to mail
service of process was the result of necessary procedural modifications
due to societal changes, so too is the transition from tangible papers
service to intangible electronic service. As the world 'shrinks' and
individuals become more mobile, new methods of communication will
continue to develop .... [And these] methods can aid in the proper
administration of justice ....
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Several recent developments in the law exemplify this
procedural evolution. First, as noted above, the FRCP
permits electronic service of process for persons or entities
outside the United States under certain circumstances.191
Second, FRCP 5(b) was amended in 2001 expressly to
permit parties to serve pleadings (other than complaints)
and other papers by, inter alia, electronic means where the
person being served expressly consents in writing.
19 2
Conley, supra note 35, at 423; Tamayo, supra note 38, at 257 ("As methods of
communication improve and individual mobility increases, mechanisms for
serving process should evolve to allow for more convenient methods [of service
and that] ... electronic service of process will [ultimately] present an additional
and effective option for serving process.").
191. See supra Parts III and IV (discussing electronic service under FRCP
4(f)(3)).
192. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(d), (b)(3) ("Service by electronic means is
complete on transmission .... [but such service] is not effective if the party
making service learns that the attempted service did not reach the person to be
served."). Electronic service of pleadings requires written consent by the person
being served. Id. This requirement, howeVer, is likely to recede in time as the
legal system acknowledges the universality of electronic communication. Cf
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b) advisory committee notes (2001) ("Early experience with
electronic filing [with the court] as authorized by Rule 5(d) is positive,
supporting service by electronic means as well. Consent is required, however,
because it is not yet possible to assume universal entry into the world of
electronic communication."); see also Tamayo, supra note 38, at 246-47
(discussing e-filing by courts). Although the advisory committee notes refer to
FRCP 5(d) as authorizing electronic filing with the court, it appears to be
erroneous inasmuch as FRCP 5(e) is the subsection that permits such filing. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e). But see Exon, supra note 38, at 17 n.73 (noting erroneously
that the FRCP's "[r]ules of service regarding pleadings and papers subsequent
to the complaint, as well as subpoenas, would have to be modified to permit
electronic service"). Accordingly, FRCP 5(b) demonstrates a "significant" change
in attitude towards electronic service of papers. See 4B WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 5, § 1147. Moreover, "[tlhere are many judicial decisions delineating
what properly can and cannot be filed or served via e-mail in different
jurisdictions." Thumma & Jackson, supra note 189, at 23; Yukiyo, Ltd. v.
Watanabe, 111 F.3d 883, 885-86 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that FED. R. APP. P. 25
permits electronic filing by "delivery via a network (the Internet),... [e-mail],
and by filing a computer disk" but holding that parties must seek leave to file a
brief in CD-ROM format); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 288
(D.N.J.) (noting that defendant was served with an order to show cause via
e-mail), affd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Compact Disc Minimum
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig. Settlement, M.D.L. No. 1361 (D. Me. 2003),
available at http://musiccdsettlement.com (permitting class members to file
claims electronically at musiccdsettlement.com); In re Texaco, Inc. Shareholder
Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 577, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (extolling the public access
permitted by making class settlement documents accessible via, inter alia, e-
mail); Tamayo, supra note 38, at 248-51 (discussing cases that have permitted
electronic service).
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Likewise, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were recently
amended, effective December 1, 2002, to permit electronic
service of papers similar to that permitted under FRCP
5(b). 193 Third, FRCP 5(e) permits district courts to adopt
local rules allowing electronic filing."' Fourth, the use of e-
mail has become increasingly pervasive in litigation."'
Finally, Congress permits service of process via e-mail
under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
("ACPA"), which permits in rem actions against domain
names, where in personam jurisdiction over the defendant
cannot be obtained or where the plaintiff is unable to find
193. FED. R. App. P. 25(c)(1)(D) (permitting service by "electronic means, if
the party being served consents in writing"); FED. R. APp. P. 25(c)(2) (permitting
parties to use a court's transmission equipment, where permitted by local rule,
to make electronic service pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 25(c)(1)(D)); FED. R. APP.
P. 25(d)(1)(B) (outlining the proof of service requirements for service by e-mail
and facsimile); FED. R. APP. P. 26(c) (providing that three additional days are to
be added to the served party's response time when papers are served
electronically); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(b) (permitting service of papers
subsequent to a motion in a contested manner to be made in the same manner
as is permitted under FRCP 5(b)); The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
available at: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frap02p.pdf
(last visited Apr. 30, 2003) and the Bankruptcy Rules, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frbk02p.pdf (last visited
Apr. 30, 2003).
194. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e). FRCP 5(e) provides that:
A court may by local rule permit papers to be filed, signed, or verified
by electronic means that are consistent with technical standards, if
any, that the Judicial Conference of the United States establishes. A
paper filed by electronic means in compliance with a local rule
constitutes a written paper for the purpose of applying these rules.
Id. See also 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1153 (discussing FRCP 5(e)).
Indeed, the federal judiciary is currently working on "nationwide
implementation of its new Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF)
systems," which will allow electronic filing. See CaseManagement/Electronic
CaseFilesCM/ECF, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf about.
html (last visited Jan. 1, 2003).
195. See generally Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561 (2001) (discussing electronic discovery); see also
Conley, supra note 35, at 415-16 (discussing e-discovery under FRCP 34);
Tamayo, supra note 38, at 247-48 (discussing the admission of e-mail as
evidence); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(establishing discovery protocol for a defendant's hard-drive); Thumma &
Jackson, supra note 189, at 4-14 (discussing the "general evolution of e-mail in
litigation, which like e-mail use itself, has expanded drastically in recent
years").
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the defendant despite due diligence.196 These developments
demonstrate a trend towards universal electronic service.
In order to further advance this evolutionary trend,
itself a manifestation of real world necessities, FRCP 4
should be amended to permit electronic service of process
upon parties within the United States in the same manner
that such service is currently permitted upon parties
outside the United States.197 FRCP 4(e) should be amended
by adding the following provision:
(3) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
the individual via electronic means such as electronic mail or
facsimile where directed by the court.' 98
Such an amendment ("Proposed FRCP 4(e)(3)") Should be
coupled with a corresponding amendment to FRCP 4(h)(1)
in the form of the following italicized text:
[I]n a judicial district of the United States in the manner
prescribed for individuals by subdivisions (e)(1) or (e)(3), or by
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint...
Proposed FRCP 4(e)(3), in conjunction with Amended
FRCP 4(h)(1) (collectively the "Proposed Amendments"),
would permit electronic service of process upon individuals
and corporate entities inside the United States in the same
196. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(d) (2001); Cable News Network L.P. v.
CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489 (E.D. Va. 2001) (permitting service of
process via Fed Ex and via e-mail pursuant to ACPA); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v.
www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2000) (permitting service
by e-mail and regular mail under ACPA); see generally Elizabeth D. Lauzon,
Validity, Construction, and Application of Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d), 177 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002). Although ACPA
is beyond the scope of this article, it nonetheless demonstrates that Congress is
willing to permit electronic service of process within the United States where
there is an unknown or unreachable defendant.
197. See Exon, supra note 38, at 17 (proposing an international cyber-court
and noting that, if the cyber-court's procedural rules were modeled after the
FRCP, the FRCP would require "minimal" modification in order to allow
electronic service of process); Perritt, supra note 7, at 33 n.144 ("The Federal
Rules Advisory Committee has not officially proposed these amendments to
allow electronic service of process; however, there have been discussions
centered around this possibility."). But see Tamayo, supra note 38, at 252(suggesting that e-mail service would be viable under two circumstances,
neither of which concern the propriety of such service under FRCP 4).
198. Likewise, the conjunction "or" would need to be added to the end of
FRCP 4(e)(2).
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manner that is currently allowed under FRCP 4(f)(3) for
service outside the United States.199 Indeed, for purposes of
service of process, no apparent reason exists to differentiate
between a moving target inside the United States (over
whom electronic service is not permitted) from one that is
outside the United States (over whom electronic service is
permitted as discussed in Parts II and III above).
The Proposed Amendments should be adopted for the
same reasons that courts have permitted electronic service
under FRCP 4(f)(3)."' Courts would serve as gatekeepers,
thereby prohibiting parties from indiscriminately
attempting to use electronic service.' -Consequently, courts
would likely require plaintiffs to make some showing that
traditional means of service are inadequate or that the
party to be served consented-as courts have done in the
FRCP 4(f)(3) context.2 2 Of course, courts would be required
to evaluate the constitutionality of any requested service to
ensure that it comports with Mullane. In addition to
making the Proposed Amendments, there are a few areas in
which the trend towards universal electronic service could
be furthered by construing the existing FRCP in a manner
that "secure[s] the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."2 4
199. See supra Parts II and III; see also supra note 196 (discussing the
circumstances under which domestic electronic service of process is permitted
under ACPA). The Proposed Amendments would permit service via e-mail or
facsimile, while providing sufficient definitional flexibility to encompass other
means as well.
200. See supra Parts III and IV.
201. This is not to say that, after experimentation with electronic service
under FRCP 4(f)(3) or Proposed FRCP 4(e)(3) electronic service would not
ultimately evolve to the point where it becomes as acceptable a method of
service as regular mail, thereby eliminating the need for court authorization.
Indeed, once courts become more comfortable with the concept of electronic
service, this author anticipates that such service will become the norm rather
than the exception.
202. Such consent could be express, as it was in Broadfoot, or implied as it
was in Rio Properties. Accordingly, consent would presumably exist where
parties: (1) encourage parties to do business or otherwise communicate
electronically, such as in Rio Properties or Ryan; or (2) where parties actually do
communicate with the plaintiff electronically, such as in Broadfoot or Hollow.
203. See supra Parts I, III-IV (discussing the requirement that service is
constitutional under the Due Process Clause).
204. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See generally Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising
Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1,
75 B.U. L. REV. 1325 (1995) (discussing FRCP 1 and its role in the dispute
resolution process).
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First, it is conceivable that a plaintiff could use e-mail
or other electronic means under FRCP 4(d)2. 5 to request a
waiver of service from the defendant.2 "6 To do so requires
that the phrase "other reliable means" be interpreted to
include e-mail and/or other electronic means.2  To the
extent that courts have found e-mail and other electronic
means "reliable" enough to pass constitutional muster
under Mullane when authorizing service under FRCP
4(f)(3),208 it appears likely that a court would find electronic
means to be reliable within the meaning of FRCP
4(d)(2)(B). 2 9 Although it is unlikely that an evasive
defendant would waive service of process, the ability to
make a waiver request via electronic means is strategically
important because parties who fail to comply with a request
for waiver of service shall be responsible for the costs of
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (granting defendants certain procedural
advantages in return for agreeing to waive service of process).
206. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) advisory committee's note (1993) (The
amendments to FRCP 4(d)(2)(B) permit parties to make waiver requests via
"electronic communications... [which] may be equally reliable and on occasion
more convenient to the parties. Especially with respect to transmissions to
foreign countries, alternative means may be desirable, for in some countries
facsimile transmission is the most efficient and economical means of
communication"); Cantor, supra note 38, at 953-56, 960-61 (noting the
possibility of using electronic means of communication for purposes of making
waiver requests); Exon, supra note 38, at 17-18 (suggesting that e-mail could be
used when requesting a waiver of service under FRCP 4(d)); Tamayo, supra
note 38, at 253 (same). Accordingly, it appears that FRCP 4(d) currently
permits parties to make waiver requests electronically. If the Proposed
Amendments were enacted, however, the cost-shifting regime of FRCP 4(d)(2)
would be less of a deterrent inasmuch as plaintiffs would have the option of
effecting service electronically-which is practically costless. This consequence,
however, would be desirable inasmuch as FRCP 4(d) is designed to "eliminate
the costs of service of a summons. . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) advisory committee's
note (1993). Although one commentator has suggested imposing a cost-shifting
scheme similar to that created by FRCP 4(d)(2) on individuals that do not
register electronic addresses for service with process-a proposition that
appears to be remain a little ahead of its time-such would be superfluous in
light of the Proposed Amendments. See Tamayo, supra note 38, at 256.
207. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2)(B) ("The notice and request... (B) shall be
dispatched through first-class mail or other reliable means.") (emphasis added);
Cantor, supra note 38, at 953-56.
208. See supra Parts II-IV.
209. Inasmuch as FRCP 4(d)(2)(B) uses the phrase "other reliable means"-
as opposed to "mail"-such a likelihood is not undermined by analysis of case
law holding that "mail" encompasses neither private carriers nor facsimile
transmissions. See Cantor, supra note 38, at 956-62.
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service."'° Accordingly, courts should take the small step of
interpreting FRCP 4(d)(2)(B) as permitting electronic
delivery of a request for waiver of service.
Second, courts should continue the trend towards
universal electronic service by interpreting FRCP 45(b)(1)
as permitting electronic service of subpoenas."' FRCP
45(b)(1) provides that subpoenas are served by "delivering a
copy thereof' to the person being subpoenaed.2 2 Several
courts have recently held that serving a subpoena by mail
constitutes "delivery" within the meaning of FRCP 45(b)(1),
thus deviating from previous case law that interpreted
FRCP 45(b)(1) as requiring personal service.21 Accordingly,
210. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) advisory committee's note (1993). The advisory
committee explains that:
The rule operates to impose upon the defendant those costs that could
have been avoided if the defendant had cooperated reasonably in the
manner prescribed. This device is useful in dealing with defendants
who are furtive, who reside in places not easily reached by process
servers, or who are outside the United States and can be served only at
substantial and unnecessary expense.
Id.
211. See Exon, supra note 38, at 19 (proposing an international cyber-court
and suggesting that "[e]-mail and telefax service [of process] could apply to...
subpoenas").
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1).
213. See Ultradent Prods., Inc. v. Hayman, No. M8-85 RPP, 2002 WL
31119425, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002) (holding that service of subpoena by
certified mail was sufficient under FRCP 45(b)(1), which merely requires
"deliver[y]"); Cohen v. Doyaga, No. 00-CV-2090 (FB), 2001 WL 257828, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2001) (permitting service of a subpoena by mail because
"[plersonal service of a subpoena on a non-party in a bankruptcy proceeding is
not required, and may be accomplished in a manner 'reasonably calculated to
give the non-party notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard');
Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld, No. 99 Civ. 3200 (DLC), 2000 WL 10268, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2000) (holding that certified mail was sufficient to serve a non-
party with subpoena, especially in light of repeated attempts at service); Doe v.
Hersemann, 155 F.R.D. 630 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (finding service of subpoena by
certified mail to be sufficient under FRCP 45 because "delivery" does not
require personal service where the mailman is not a party and is not less-than
18 years old); First Nationwide Bank v. Shur (In re Shur), 184 B.R. 640, 642-44
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); King v. Crown Plastering Corp., 170 F.R.D. 355,
356 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing In re Shur with approval); cf. First City, Texas-
Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 197 F.R.D. 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also
Orlee Goldfeld, Rule 45(b): Ambiguity in Federal Subpoena Service, 20 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1065, 1071 n.41 (1999) (discussing FRCP 45(b) and noting that Doe was
the first decision to permit service of a subpoena by certified mail). Many of
these decisions relied on FRCP 1, which requires courts to "secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
Accordingly, this ambiguity in FRCP 45(b)(1) should be interpreted to permit
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inasmuch as e-mail and/or facsimile transmissions are as
reliable as mail delivery (and perhaps more so in some
cases), this rationale should be extended to electronic
means of "delivery" as well when effected by a person who is
not a party and is not less-than 18 years old.21' Indeed,
"delivery" of a summons and complaint "includes any act or
series of acts that reasonably assures the entity to which it
is addressed fair and timely notice of its issuance, contents,
purpose and effect."21
In sum, the Proposed Amendments would be a logical
extension of an existing trend towards universal electronic
service. Like more "traditional" methods of service,216 courts
are starting to find that electronic service is also
constitutionally permissible under Mullane.217 Indeed, it is
only a matter of time before electronic service becomes the
rule rather than the exception and electronic iconoclasts
prevail over traditionalists.' Moreover, the trend towards
electronic service of a subpoena. Alternatively, FRCP 45 should be amended to
conform with the Proposed Amendments to FRCP 4. See Goldfeld, supra, at
1090 (concluding that FRCP 45 should be amended to specifically permit
"substituted methods of service").
214. See supra Part III (discussing the reliability of e-mail and whether e
mail should be included in "mail" within the meaning of statutes and other legal
provisions); cf Salbu, supra note 1, at 471-72 (suggesting that mail and e-mail
are indistinguishable for purposes of defamation). Moreover, the
constitutionality of electronic service of a subpoena in any given case may be
tested when the subpoenaed party moves to quash the subpoena. Indeed, unlike
parties served process by electronic means, subpoenaed parties do not risk
being defaulted.
215. In re Shur, 184 B.R. at 644 (holding that "the only limitation upon
service under Rule 45 is that the procedure employed be reasonably calculated
to give the non-party actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard"). Accordingly, where electronic service satisfies Mullane, parties should
be allowed to electronically serve subpoena's. But see Firefighters' Inst. for
Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding
that service of a subpoena by facsimile and regular mail was insufficient under
FRCP 45 because the court "cannot be assured that delivery has occurred").
Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "delivery" does not
necessarily require personal delivery, it nonetheless suggested that certified
mail, at a minimum, would be required to assure delivery. Id. (citing Doe). This
holding appears to be overly restrictive and the line of cases holding that the
only limitation upon delivery is Mullane are better reasoned.
216. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust & Bank Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950) ("Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the
classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.").
217. See supra Parts II-IV.
218. See Tamayo, supra note 38, at 253 ("As individuals and businesses
increase their use of electronic communications, statutory and judicial
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universal electronic service should also be advanced by
interpreting FRCP 4(d)(2)(B) and FRCP 45(b)(1) in a
manner that permits electronic service.
CONCLUSION: THERE IS A TREND IN THE LAW TOWARDS
ELECTRONIC SERVICE THAT SHOULD BE EXTENDED AND
WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME THE RULE RATHER THAN
THE EXCEPTION
Narrow concepts of territoriality established in the
nineteenth century generally gave way to the commercial
realities of the twentieth century, resulting in an expanded
scope of personal jurisdiction, and by extension, new
methods of service of process over a greater geographic area
within the United States. Likewise, increasing mobility and
globalization leading up to and into the twenty-first century
have greatly increased the volume and degree of contacts
that Americans have with people around the world. In other
words, the historical trend has been ever-widening
concentric circles of human interaction, which necessitated
a more elastic notion of personal jurisdiction in order to
keep pace with commercial realities (e.g., International
Shoe), which in turn prompted courts to adopt a
corresponding flexibility with respect to service of process
sufficient to effectuate their newly expanded long-arm
reach (e.g., Mullane, under which service by mail and e-
mail has been authorized).
Although society has been quicker to embrace electronic
communication than the courts have, 19 the judiciary has
movement toward legal recognition that a defendant may be found at his or her
e-mail address for purposes of service of process may be reasonably expected.").
Further, Jenna Karadbil explains that:
[It] only seems a matter of time before statutes and case law recognize
that a defendant is presumed to be found at his or her designated email
address. In fact, some courts have routinely held that emails are
presumed to have been sent by the person identified in the 'from'
section of the address. Consequently, courts should also find that
emails are presumed to be received by the person identified in the 'to'
section of the address.
Karadbil, supra note 138, at 21.
219. See, e.g., Conley, supra note 35, at 417; cf. Powell v. State, 717 So. 2d
1050, 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that "[diefense counsel attempted
to communicate with the court by electronic mail and was told to expect no
response to such electronic mailings").
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nonetheless begun to accept electronic methods of
communication.2 Indeed, there is a trend in the law toward
electronic service that will eventually become the rule
rather than the exception as human interactions continue
to become increasingly global in scope. 22' The real world
operates in an electronic age;222 so too must the courts.
Indeed, where personal jurisdiction exists over an elusive
defendant, plaintiffs need the freedom to adopt the same
means of electronic communication for service of process
(and subpoenas) that defendants use in their everyday lives
and business activities.223  Accordingly, the Proposed
Amendments to the FRCP suggested herein should be
adopted in order to make uniform the circumstances under
which electronic service of process is allowed.
220. See Thumma & Jackson, supra note 189, at 23 ("Increasing use of e-
mail by lawyers and the ability to instantaneously transmit documents via e-
mail has resulted in courts considering e-mail in deciding procedural issues.").
This article was itself submitted electronically. Although some law reviews do
not accept electronically submitted manuscripts, many do. This author
anticipates that electronic submission will become the norm among law reviews.
See Richard A. Bales, Electronically Submitting Manuscripts to Law Reviews,
30 STETSON L. REV. 577 (2000) (discussing electronic manuscript submissions
and containing a list of journals that accept electronic submissions); cf Stephen
R. Heifetz, Efficient Matching: Reforming The Market for Law Review Articles,
56 GEO. MASON L. REV. 629 (1997) (discussing the law review submission
process and proposing a centralized submission process that would reduce
transaction costs and increase efficient matching).
221. See supra Parts III and V.
222. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir.
2002) ("Although communication via email and over the Internet is
comparatively new, such communication has been zealously embraced within
the business community."). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in Mullane
discussed whether a prudent businessperson would adopt notice by publication,
and found it significant that one would not. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
& Bank Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1950). Applying the prudent businessman
standard to electronic service, a court would undoubtedly find that a prudent
businessperson would use e-mail or facsimile to communicate with someone
known to use such means.
223. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 ("Indeed, when faced with an
international e-business scofflaw, playing hide-and-seek with the federal court,
email may be the only means of effecting service of process."); Cantor, supra
note 38, at 963 (concluding that "rules governing service should permit Internet
service").
